In both Situation 1 and Situation 2, A and B each have a reasonable expectation of reimbursement. At the end of 2020, the reimbursement of A’s and B’s eligible expenses, in the form of covered loan forgiveness, is reasonably expected to occur – rather than being unforeseeable – such that a deduction is inappropriate.
Fascinating logic, that bit about “reimbursement…in the form of covered loan forgiveness.” Since when is the act of forgivenesss a reimbursement? Reimbursements are made in cash. And in the case of the PPP, that cash came up front, much like an employer that advances $X to its employee for an upcoming business trip.
That Canelo case was one involving a lawyer that paid various costs on behalf of the client and then the client LATER reimbursed the lawyer. To liken Canelo to the PPP situation, we would need Canelo’s client to first advance funds to Canelo (just like the government first advances funds to the employer under the PPP). Next, when Canelo pays the expenses, Canelo would debit Payable to Client and credit Cash. If all money in to Canelo equals all money out from Canelo, nothing hits Canelo’s P&L. And there is no more “Payable to Client” on Canelo’s Balance Sheet. Thus, there is nothing to forgive. But even if the client sent Canelo a letter saying, “I see that you have properly expended all funds I advanced to you for case costs. Therefore, I forgive, from repayment, all amounts that I advanced to you up front”…that meaningless gesture wouldn’t amount to a reimbursement. The “reimbursement” comes up front in the PPP situation. But if you disagree and urge us to look at the timeline, such that your argument is that the “reimbursement” takes place when we pay a qualifying PPP expenditure - because it is at that moment that we make our journal entry to debit “Payable to Client” - then fine. That point in time is still before the date on which the loan is formally forgiven.
In a nutshell, the Rev Rul would have us believe that the “reimbursement” takes place when the loan is forgiven. Of the three possibilities (when the cash is initally advanced, when the employer pays a qualifying expense, forgiveness) that is the one possibility that doesn’t make any sense. So, there is flaw in the IRS’ logic here. Now, if this flaw didn’t exist, and the IRS actually picked the right date in the Rev Rul as the reimbursement date, the IRS would still end up with the same conclusion, it’s just that their conclusion would be better reasoned. That would be a consistent IRS argument in favor of the Right of Reimbursement theory. At that point, I would refer you back to some of the comments I made in Post #50, for example.