Reckless spelling wreaks havoc sometimes.
That PLR is pretty interesting.
Reckless spelling wreaks havoc sometimes.
That PLR is pretty interesting.
but he proceeded to walk underneath him to deliver the mail. Client says that the mailman even made an effort to catch him.
Unless the TP's home office is used to run a window washing service, I think window washing is not a profit seeking activity. Rather, it is an activity of a homeowner.
Why was the claim not tendered?
Jeff-Ohio wrote:Unless the TP's home office is used to run a window washing service, I think window washing is not a profit seeking activity. Rather, it is an activity of a homeowner.
The window in question was in the OP’s home office, as stated in the OP.Why was the claim not tendered?
l.
keiser wrote:Are tenants in second floor offices "ordinarily" required to clean the outside of windows?
U.S. Supreme CourtThe course of decision here makes it plain that the statute does not use the term "gift" in the common law sense, but in a more colloquial sense. This Court has indicated that a voluntarily executed transfer of his property by one to another, without any consideration or compensation therefor, though a common law gift, is not necessarily a "gift" within the meaning of the statute. For the Court has shown that the mere absence of a legal or moral obligation to make such a payment does not establish that it is a gift. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U. S. 716, 279 U. S. 730. And, importantly, if the payment proceeds primarily from "the constraining force of any moral or legal duty," or from "the incentive of anticipated benefit" of an economic nature, Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U. S. 34, 302 U. S. 41, it is not a gift. And, conversely, "[w]here the payment is in return for services rendered, it is irrelevant that the donor derives no economic benefit from it." Robertson v. United States, 343 U. S. 711, 343 U. S. 714. [Footnote 7] A gift in the statutory sense, on the other hand, proceeds from a "detached and disinterested generosity," Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U. S. 243, 351 U. S. 246; "out of affection, respect, admiration, charity or like impulses." Robertson v. United States, supra, at 343 U. S. 714. And, in this regard, the most critical consideration, as the Court was agreed in the leading case here, is the transferor's "intention."
But the building owner in this case is the homeowner, not the business operated in a home office using 10% of his house.
Go a step further, what if contractor was cleaning the eaves on his shop used exclusively for business when he fell on mailman, why would that change the outcome? He was engaged in an ordinary and necessary maintenance procedure. How would this scenario be different from a tax point of view from yours?
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